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Abstract
Data augmentation techniques have become standard practice in deep learning, as
it has been shown to greatly improve the generalisation abilities of models. These
techniques rely on different ideas such as invariance-preserving transformations
(e.g, expert-defined augmentation), statistical heuristics (e.g, Mixup), and learning
the data distribution (e.g, GANs). However, in the adversarial settings it remains
unclear under what conditions such data augmentation methods reduce or even
worsen the misclassification risk. In this paper, we therefore analyse the effect
of different data augmentation techniques on the adversarial risk by three mea-
sures: (a) the well-known risk under adversarial attacks, (b) a new measure of
prediction-change stress based on the Laplacian operator, and (c) the influence of
training examples on prediction. The results of our empirical analysis disprove
the hypothesis that an improvement in the classification performance induced by
a data augmentation is always accompanied by an improvement in the risk under
adversarial attack. Further, our results reveal that the augmented data has more
influence than the non-augmented data, on the resulting models. Taken together,
our results suggest that general-purpose data augmentations that do not take into
the account the characteristics of the data and the task, must be applied with care.
1 Introduction
Data augmentation is one of the fundamental building blocks of deep learning, and it has been shown
that without it, deep neural networks suffer from various problems such as lack of generalisation [24,
1, 32, 4] and adversarial vulnerability [33, 24, 30, 31]. By affecting a model’s behavior outside of the
given training data, any data augmentation strategy introduces a certain bias caused by its assumptions
about the data, or the task at hand [3]. Some augmentation methods incorporate inductive bias into
the model by (classical) invariance-preserving geometric transformations designed by domain experts,
while others rely on statistical heuristics (e.g, Mixup [33]) or sampling from a learnt data distribution
(e.g, GANs [1, 31]).
Although it is known that some data augmentation methods reduce classification error and/or adver-
sarial risk, the relationship between the error and the adversarial risk, under different assumptions
imposed by the augmentation strategies has not been extensively studied. Furthermore, the level of
influence from the augmented data on the resulting models, in comparison with the influence of the
original training data, remains unclear. These two aspects are particularly important, as it has been
shown that adversarial examples [11, 19, 5, 27] –a known issue in deep neural networks– are the
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result of features that lie in the data space [16], hence the robust or non-robust nature of the features
in the data, defines the amount of adversarial risk in the resulting models. Therefore, it is important
to study the relationship between the data augmentation and adversarial risk.
In this work, we therefore address two research questions that have been underrepresented: (a), the
qualitative analysis question, what (side) effects do the different data augmentation strategies have on
the risk of misclassification of a model compared to the adversarial risk? and (b), the quantitative
analysis question, how to detect and analyse such effects by quantitative indicators e.g. by measuring
the influence of augmented data versus the original data on the overall model’s behavior?
Regarding question (a), extensive experiments with different data augmentation methods, and with
systematic adversarial attacks, reveal that the success of a data augmentation in reducing the classifi-
cation error of a model, is not an indicator of its capabilities in lowering of the adversarial risk. We
observe that while some of the augmentation strategies (such as Mixup and GANs) both improve
classification performances (notably to a lower degree), one (Mixup) achieves the highest adversarial
risk, while the other (GANs) results in models with the lowest risk under attack. We also observe that
expert-introduced augmentations achieve the lowest classification error, and at the same time, they
are among the most adversarially robust models.
Regarding question (b), to reveal the underlying reasons behind, we propose a new measure called
prediction-change stress which provides an estimate on the robustness of model’s predictions. Using
this measure, we show that data augmentations that result in models with high prediction-change
stress around test examples, suffer from high risk under adversarial attacks, while data augmentation
strategies that result in models with low prediction-change stress are the most adversarially robust.
Finally, we use ‘influence functions’ [17] to estimate the amount of influence from original training,
and augmented data, for different augmentation methods. Our influence analysis shows that incorpo-
rating data augmentation – which is a common practice in deep learning–introduces a much higher
influence on the final model than the original data itself. This underpins our final conclusion, that the
choice of data augmentation and its assumptions must be adjusted to the characteristics of the data
and the task at hand.
Addressing both questions, our empirical analysis is based on three classes of data augmentation in
the visual domain, that is Classical augmentation via geometric transformations, Mixup [33], and
GAN augmentation, by looking at both classification error and risk under adversarial attacks.
2 Problem Description
Throughout this work let X be a random variable on a probability space pX ,A, P q with X Ă Rd,
e.g. images, and denote by P the probability measure of X , where A denotes a sigma algebra on X .
Further, let l : X Ñ Y be a labeling function to a finite set Y Ă N of labels, e.g. t1, . . . , cu.
Given a class F of functions f : X Ñ Y and a sample
S “ ppx1, lpx1qq, . . . , pxs, lpxsqqq P pX ˆ Yqs, (1)
of input-label pairs, i.e. s observations x1, . . . ,xs independently drawn from PX with corresponding
labels lpx1q, . . . , lpxsq, the problem of risk minimization is to find a function f P F with low
misclassification risk Rpf, lq :“ P pfpXq ‰ lpXqq.
One successful method for solving problems of risk minimization is to perform stochastic gradient
descent based on some parametric function class F of neural networks [20]. In many practical tasks,
this method can be improved by applying so-called data augmentation techniques.
In the following, we give a general definition of data augmentation in a probabilistic setup which
permits us to apply an augmentation function to a set of data-label pairs and transform them into
some augmented version with a certain probability.
Definition 1 (Data Augmentation). We call a random function
A : pX ˆ Yqs Ñ  X ˆ Y : X ˆ Y Ñ Rd(r (2)
a data augmentation, if it maps a sample S “ ppx1, lpx1qq, . . . , pxs, lpxsqqq P pX ˆ Yqs, with mea-
sure PX on X and labeling function l : X Ñ Y , to some vector ApSq “ pX1 ˆ Y1, . . . , Xr ˆ Yrq
of independent random vectors X1 ˆ Y1, . . . , Xr ˆ Yr : X ˆ Y Ñ Rd with measure PXIˆYI onX ˆ Y and marginal measure PXI dominating PX .
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By Definition 1, an augmented sample S˜ “ ppx˜1, y˜1q, . . . , px˜s, y˜sqq can be obtained from a sample
S P pX ˆYqs by observing the random variable ApSq. The assumption PXI dominating PX ensures
data augmentations take the original sample into account, i.e. if PXpDq ą 0 then also PXI pDq ą 0
for any measurable D.
One example of data augmentation with the goal of enriching the input manifold is the classical
(expert-based) data augmentation which combines image cropping, swapping and noise adding.
Another example is GAN-based data augmentation, which aims at generating data from the input
distribution [10]. A third example is Mixup [33] data augmentation which aims at generating data in
the vicinity of S. See Appendix A.1 for formalizations based on Definition 1.
It has been noted [33, 24, 30, 31] that training on augmented samples leads to models with lower risk
on adversarial examples when compared to models obtained without data augmentation. Typical
measures for adversarial risk are the risk under corrupted inputs, see e.g. [21, 2],
Rcorpf, l, q :“ P pDx P BpXq : fpxq ‰ lpXqq (3)
with Bpxq :“ tx1 P Rd | cpx1,xq ď u for some distance c : X ˆ X Ñ R`, the prediction-change
risk, [28],
Rpcpf, q :“ P pDx P BpXq : fpxq ‰ fpXqq (4)
and combinations of these concepts [26]. It is interesting to note, that examples can be constructed
where both formulations, Eq. 3 and Eq. 4, show counter-intuitive behaviour and therefore are better
interpreted as approximations of adversarial risk than in terms of definitions [7, 29].
However, data augmentations as given by Definition 1 do not necessarily decrease adversarial
risk as measured by Eq. 3 and Eq. 4. To see this, consider the situation of an optimal classifier
f˚ P argminfPF Rpf, lq which is not perfect, i.e. f˚ ‰ l, due to the limited complexity of the
function class F . Further consider a data augmentation that generates additional data points around
some misclassified data from the original data set. The overweighting of misclassified data might
lead to a new classifier rf P F that minimizes the loss based on the augmented data while worsening
the misclassification risk R and also the adversarial risk as measured by Eq. 3 and Eq. 4.
The example above considers idealised training scenarios where all augmented samples are taken
into account. However, in most practical cases, not all examples in the training sample have the same
influence. In addition to the measures of Eq. 3 and Eq. 4, we therefore also look at the influence
of the augmented samples as an indicator of a change in robustness compared to models obtained
without data augmentation.
2.1 Measuring the Effect of Data Augmentation on Adversarial Risk
For analysing the influence of different data augmentation techniques on the adversarial risk of
learned models (available in Section 3), we rely on three measures: (a) the estimated risk under
adversarial attacks, (b) a measure for prediction-change stress and (c) a measure for estimating the
influence of training examples on models when predicting on unseen data and adversarial examples.
While the former is a common measure for approximating Eq. 3, the latter two are new in this context.
2.1.1 Risk under Attack
In order to estimate Eq. 3 we rely on corrupted inputs generated by some adversarial attack. Therefore,
we compute a perturbation δ for an input x P X using an iterative Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
as follows:
δpf,xq :“ Ppδ ` α∇δLpfpx` δq, lpxqq, (5)
where L : Y ˆ Y Ñ R is a loss, α ą 0 is the step-size and P is a projection from the inputs X into
the ball BpX0q,  ą 01. We then approximate Eq. 3 by computing the misclassification risk on a test
sample S˜ :“ ppx11, lpx11qq, . . . , px1s, lpx1sqqq, i.e.pRcorpf, S˜, q :“ 1
s
sÿ
i“1
1fpx1i`δpf,x1iqq‰lpx1iq, (6)
where 1a‰b “ 1 if a ‰ b and 1a‰b “ 0 otherwise.
1We refer to the  and α used in PGD as PGD and PGDα
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2.1.2 Measure of Prediction-Change Stress
Due to the phenomenon of concentration of measure [8], for high dimension d the Lebesgue mea-
sure λ in a ball Bpdqr of radius r is concentrated at its surface. That is, for any δ ą 0, we have
limdÑ8pλpBpdqr q ´ λpBpdqr´δqq{λpBpdqr q “ 1 given any lp-norm (p P r1,8s) we take. As the dimen-
sion d in most applications is high, the concentration of measure effect motivates to approximate
Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 by sampling only from the shell BB (points at distance  from the center of the ball)
instead of sampling from the full ball B.
In order to estimate Eq. 4, we consider only the points on the boundary BB of the ball B and
introduce the measure of prediction-change stress on a sample S˜ :“ ppx11, lpx11qq, . . . , px1s, lpx1sqqq
by
zstresspcpf, S˜, q :“ 1
s
sÿ
i“1
1
n
nÿ
j“1
1fpx1iq‰fpyijq (7)
where yi1, . . . ,yin are uniformly sampled from BBpx1iq. Note that zstresspcpf, S˜, q « Rpcpf, q for
sufficiently high dimension d and sample size s.
Eq. 7 allows the interpretation of stress in analogy to physics where mechanical stress is a measure of
an external force acting over the cross sectional area of an object causing deformation of its geometric
shape. This interpretation is closely related to the Laplacian operator of a function f at a point x0,
which can be understood as limit of means over the differences of fpx0q and the boundary values
fpxq P BBpx0q of its surrounding -balls [25]. Note that Eq. 7 can be understood as estimation
of the Laplacian of the indicator function w.r.t. the center prediction fpxq. Utilizing this physical
interpretation therefore justifies interpreting adversarial points as imposing stress on the shape of the
decision surface. The more prediction-change stress the less robust is the model at point x.
2.2 Influence of Augmented Samples
To analyse the effect of augmented samples on the prediction of some model f , we rely on the
influence score introduced in [17] for both original and augmented training data. The influencepIpx,xtestq of an input px, lpxqq P S in the training sample S on a new test example xtest R S given a
model fθ with parameters θ is defined by:pIpx,xtestq :“ ´∇θLpfθˆpxtestq, lpxtestqqJH´1θˆ ∇θLpfθˆpxq, lpxqq, (8)
where H is the Hessian, L : Y ˆ Y Ñ R is a loss, and θˆ is the minimizer of the empirical risk
1
s
řs
i“1 Lpfθpxiq, lpxiqq. The influence score as calculated by Eq. 8 can be interpreted as measuring
how much the loss computed on a test example changes if a training sample is up-weighted.
In our empirical evaluations, we analyse the distribution of the influence values pIpx,xtestq correspond-
ing to different training examples x and test examples xtest, as measured by Eq. 8 for different data
augmentation techniques. Additionally, we analyse the distributions of influence values pIpx,xadv. testq,
for training examples x given the adversarial test examples xadv. test.
3 Empirical Evaluations
3.1 Goals and Questions
The main body of the experiments is built upon the task of image classification, as it is a widely-used
and established task in machine learning. We train Resnet50 [14] image classification models on
CIFAR10 [18]. In each experiment, we control the amount of augmentation applied during the
training. More specifically, we apply a certain data augmentation technique, with a certain probability,
during the training of a model. For each trained model, we then report the test classification error,
risk under adversarial attack, prediction-change stress, and influence scores.
Our goal is to understand the effect of each data augmentation on the resulting models as the
probability of that data augmentation increases, and discover the characteristics of the trained models,
with respect to the risk under adversarial attack, and the classification performance. As the probability
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of a data augmentation varies between 0 and 1, we can analyse its relationship with a risk, which
enables us to study the correlation between the two; and discover the bigger picture.
Given the experimental framework explained above, we are trying to address the following questions:
1) Which data augmentations lower the risk under adversarial attack, while reducing the classification
error? 2) Is an improvement in the classification performance induced by a data augmentation, always
accompanied by an improvement in the risk under adversarial attack? 3) Is the proposed prediction-
change stress, a good indicator for the risk under adversarial attacks? and 4) Does augmented data
have a higher influence on the final models, in comparison with the non-augmented data? In the
upcoming sections, we provide the results of our experiments, and answer the questions above.
Additional discussions on our empirical results, along with extended experiments are provided in
Section A.5 of the Appendix.
3.2 Experimental Setup
Applying data augmentation: In our empirical analysis, we investigate 3 data augmentations,
namely, Classical, Mixup, and GAN augmentation. Each data augmentation is applied independently,
to measure its impact on the models. During training of each model, a data augmentation, with a
certain probability is selected. The augmentation is applied on each training example with the given
probability. This means that if the probability of augmentation is set to 0.5, each training sample
has 50% chance of being augmented with the given augmentation method. The probability of data
augmentation for each augmentation method, is varied between 0 and 1 (with 0.1 increments), and is
referred to as PAug .
Classification experiments: For each data augmentation, and for a given augmentation probability,
a Resnet50 model is trained for 200 epochs using SGD, weight-decay, and learning-rate schedule.
Each experiment is repeated three times, where in each experiment the models were initialised using a
different random seed. The details of the training procedure is provided in the Appendix Section A.2.
Adversarial attacks: After a model is fully trained, four white-box PGD attacks are performed on
the test set with PGD of 0.5 and 0.25, and with 10 and 100 iterations, and PGDα is always set to
PGD{5. PGD is the radius for threat model, while PGDα is the step size for adversarial attacks. More
details about the attacks are given in the Appendix Section A.3.
Evaluation measures: The trained models are evaluated with the classification error on the test set,
Risk Under Adversarial Attack as defined in Section 2.1.1, Prediction-change Stress as detailed in
Section 2.1.2, and Influence Scores as explained in Section 2.2.
In our empirical analysis using the prediction-change stress, we report the results using BBε “
tx P Rd | řdk“1 x2k “ ε2u (l2 norm), and according to Eq. 7. We provide the prediction-change
stress for the 50k non-augmented, and 50k augmented examples randomly chosen from the training
set, and for all the 10k test examples. We randomly sample 1K points from the sphere surface
BBεpxq around each data point x. We evaluate models trained with all augmentation methods, for
PAug P t0.1, 0.5, 0.9u.
In the influence analysis experiments, we compute the influence scores of 50k non-augmented, and
50k augmented training examples on 200 randomly chosen test examples and their adversarially-
perturbed counterparts. We calculate the influence scores for models trained with Classical-, MixUp-,
and GAN-augmentations and PAug P t0.1, 0.5, 0.9u. For the creation of the adversarially perturbed
test sets, we start with a fixed set of randomly selected 20 test samples per class, and conduct a PGD
attack with 10 iterations using PGD “ 0.25 and PGDα “ 0.05.
Classical Augmentation: We apply horizontal flipping, changing the brightness, contrast and satura-
tion, random cropping, and random rotation, which are known expert-introduced data augmentations
for the CIFAR10 dataset.
GAN Augmentation: We train label-conditional GANs [22]. Each generator is conditioned on the
one-hot vector of the label, which is concatenated to the noise vector, and is trained to generate
samples that match the conditioned class label. We test two different GAN objectives, namely,
non-saturating GAN [10], and Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty [13]. Both models are trained
to convergence, and both achieved state-of-the-art Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [15]. Randomly
generated samples are shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix A.4. More details about the attacks are
given in the Appendix Section A.4.
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Mixup Augmentation: We apply Mixup with Mixupα “ 1, as it was used for CIFAR10 experiments
in [33], where Mixupα is the hyperparameter that controls the beta distribution.
3.3 Results for the Classification Error and Risk Under Attack
In this section, we report the classification error, and risk under several adversarial attacks, for
different data augmentations, and different augmentation probabilities. As can be seen in Figure 1.c,
Classical data augmentation achieves the lowest classification error, and surpasses Mixup and GAN
augmentations by a large margin. Our results show that Mixup can lower the classification error,
while both GANs do not have a significant effect on the classification error. We can observe that in
all methods, the error declines to a certain degree, as the probability of augmentation increases, then
increases again (although for GAN-augmentations, this is less visible compared to the others). These
results suggests that Classical data augmentation is the most successful in lowering the classification
error, while GAN augmentation has almost no effect in the classification error. Mixup shows some
success in lowering the classification error, however it achieves a higher error compared to Classical
augmentation.
In contrast to the classification error, we can see in Figures 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, 1.e that applying Mixup
significantly increases the risk under adversarial attacks, in all the 4 PGD attacks. We can additionally
observe that the GAN-augmentations, and the Classical augmentation achieve significantly lower risk
under adversarial attacks in comparison with Mixup. As the strength of the attack increases (larger
PGD, more iterations), the gap between different augmentation closes, as all models are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. The difference beween augmentations can be better observed in weaker attacks
(10 iterations). In Figures 1.a, 1.b we can observe a large gap between the risk under attack in Mixup,
and other augmentation methods (Classical and GAN-augmentations).
As discussed, Mixup and Classical augmentation reduce the classification error, while GAN-
augmentations do not have a significant effect on the classification performance. In contrast, Mixup
augmentation results in a significant increase in the risk under adversarial attack, while Classical
and GAN augmentations incorporate adversarial robustness to the models to some extent. It can
be seen that in attacks with 10 iterations (Figures 1.a, 1.b) increasing the augmentation probability
does not result in an increase in risk under adversarial attacks for Classical and GAN-augmentations.
In stronger attacks (100 iterations shown in Figures 1.d, 1.e), we can observe an increase in the
risk under attack with the augmentation probability for both Classical and Mixup, although Mixup
achieves a significantly higher risk.
We also observe that while for some augmentations the risk under adversarial attack rises when the
classification error declines (Figures 1.a (Mixup), 1.b (Classic, Mixup), 1.d (Classic, Mixup))2, in
Figure 1.e, this is not the case; which can be due to the strength of the attack. All in all, our results
disprove the hypothesis that an improvement in the classification performance induced by a data
augmentation, is always accompanied by an improvement in the risk under adversarial attack (a
counter example is Mixup).
Figure (1) Comparison between the classification error and Risk Under Adversarial Attack (RUA)
of different augmentation methods on the test set of CIFAR10.
2This phenomenon is known as the trade-off between the classification error and adversarial risk [29]
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3.4 Results for the Prediction-Change Stress
Figure 2 shows the prediction-change stress over the original non-augmented training, augmented-
training and the testing datasets for  P t0.25, 0.5, 1, 2u.
Non-augmented training data: As can be seen, the results show that the prediction-change stress
around the non-augmented training data is significantly smaller, compared to both the augmented
training, and the test data. These results suggest that the trained models have more consistent
predictions in the neighborhood around the non-augmented training data.
Augmented training data: For the augmented data, we can see that in models with GAN and
Classical augmentations the prediction-change stress follows a decreasing trend as PAug increases
(especially, from 0.1 to 0.5). This trend is the opposite for models trained with Mixup, where the
prediction-change stress is increased with PAug . This suggests that Classical and GAN-augmentations
makes the model predictions more consistent around the augmented samples, while Mixup fails to
achieve this.
Test data: On the test set, we can see that the difference between different data augmentations are
minimal, when the augmentation probability is low (0.1). As PAug increases, we can observe that the
Mixup augmentation results in models with a larger prediction-change stress around the testing points,
compared to the other augmentations. These result shows that models trained with Mixup have a
more inconsistent predictions around the test examples. Therefore, it is easier to find an example in a
small neighborhood of test examples, such that the predictions of such models are changed. These
results are also aligned with the results presented in Figure 1, as models trained with Mixup achieve
the highest risk under adversarial attacks. Based on this result, we consider the prediction-change
stress as an indicator of the risk under adversarial attacks, hence, an evaluation measure of models in
the context of adversarial robustness.
Comparing different values for , we observe that overall, applying Mixup results in higher prediction-
change stress around test examples, compared to other augmentations. We can also observe a trend
that while for smaller  values, the difference in the prediction-change stress is higher in models
augmented with Mixup, as the  increases, the gap between the prediction-change stress closes.
This observation is also on par with the results reported in Figure 1, as the difference between risk
under adversarial attacks in models augmented using different approaches reduced by increasing the
strength of the attack. Additional results on the prediction-change stress are provided in Section A.7
in the Appendix.
Figure (2) Comparison between the Prediction-Change Stress of models with different augmenta-
tions. The y-axis indicates the different sets. The non-Aug and Aug. refer to the training set.
3.5 Results for the Influence Scores
Figure 3 compares the distribution of influence scores for non-augmented and augmented training
samples, given test samples and their adversarially perturbed counterparts. What stands out in this
figure is that, across all augmentation techniques and percentages, influence scores of augmented
training samples are spread over a broader range compared to non-augmented training samples. These
results suggest that, in general, augmented training data contribute stronger towards increasing and
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decreasing the loss on both original and adversarially perturbed training samples; hence having more
influence on training of the models.
This difference in range can be explained by the incorporated randomness in the augmented data, as
opposed to the non-augmented data. Since the non-augmented training data is deterministic, they have
been ‘seen’ by the model multiple times during training. Consequently, the the average gradient-norm
and the loss for the non-augmented examples is overall lower compared to the (previously unseen)
augmented examples (see Section A.6 in the Appendix); considering that each augmented data
is different from the others, as they are sampled from a stochastic function. This explanation is
consistent with our Prediction-Change Stress results (Section 3.4), where we observe significantly
lower prediction change stress on the non-augmented training samples.
Our findings suggest that augmented data are more influential during training in comparison to
non-augmented data, and therefor data augmentation must always be applied by carefully taking the
data and the task characteristics into consideration. The extended influence results are provided in
Section A.6 in the Appendix.
Figure (3) Comparison between the distribution of original and augmented influence values from
the training data, when predicting on the real and the adversarial test set of CIFAR10.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the effect of data augmentation techniques on the adversarial risks,
as well as their influence on the final models. Our empirical analysis showed that while some data
augmentations can reduce classification error, this improvement in the classification performance
is not always accompanied by an improvement in the risk under adversarial attack. We proposed
a new measure, namely the Prediction-change Stress, that can be used to analyse the behaviour of
models in an adversarial setting, and we showed that it strongly correlates with risk under adversarial
attack. Finally, by incorporating influence functions we showed that regardless of their effects on the
classification performance and risk under adversarial attack, augmented data has a significantly higher
influence on the models compared to non-augmented data. Hence, the choice of data augmentation
and its assumptions must be adjusted to the characteristics of the data and the task at hand, to minimise
the adversarial risk of the resulting models.
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Broader Impact
This study is intended to raise awareness of possible undesirable side effects for some of the widely
used techniques in deep learning, as well as providing case studies for the follow-up basic research in
the direction of robustness, analysis and understanding of deep neural networks.
The contributions offered by our paper are not new methods or algorithms, but new insights into
existing methods and their vulnerabilities, along with the definition of new measures that help us gain
such insights. We view this as a (small) step towards more reliable and trustworthy machine learning
algorithms. In a broader context, a deeper understanding of a (by now) pervasive technology such as
deep learning may not change anything about its biases or misuse potential in real-world applications,
but it does hold the promise of making such models and their decision basis more transparent.
Acknowledgments
This work has been supported by the COMET-K2 Center of the Linz Center of Mechatronics (LCM)
funded by the Austrian federal government and the federal state of Upper Austria, and has been partly
funded by BMK, BMDW, and the Province of Upper Austria in the frame of the COMET Programme
managed by FFG in the COMET Module S3AI.
References
[1] Anthreas Antoniou, Amos Storkey, and Harrison Edwards. Data augmentation generative adversarial
networks, 2018.
[2] Idan Attias, Aryeh Kontorovich, and Yishay Mansour. Improved generalization bounds for robust learning.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.02180, 2018.
[3] Peter W Battaglia, Jessica B Hamrick, Victor Bapst, Alvaro Sanchez-Gonzalez, Vinicius Zambaldi, Mateusz
Malinowski, Andrea Tacchetti, David Raposo, Adam Santoro, Ryan Faulkner, et al. Relational inductive
biases, deep learning, and graph networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.01261, 2018.
[4] David Berthelot, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Nicolas Papernot, Avital Oliver, and Colin A Raffel.
Mixmatch: A holistic approach to semi-supervised learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 5050–5060, 2019.
[5] Battista Biggio and Fabio Roli. Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise of adversarial machine learning.
Pattern Recognition, 84:317–331, 2018.
[6] Rüdiger Busche. Incense (python library), 2019.
[7] Dimitrios I. Diochnos, Saeed Mahloujifar, and Mohammad Mahmoody. Adversarial risk and robustness:
General definitions and implications for the uniform distribution, 2018.
[8] David Donoho. High-dimensional data analysis: The curses and blessings of dimensionality. AMS Math
Challenges Lecture, pages 1–32, 01 2000.
[9] Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, and Dimitris Tsipras. Robustness (python library),
2019.
[10] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron
Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in neural information processing
systems, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[11] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[12] Klaus Greff, Aaron Klein, Martin Chovanec, Frank Hutter, and Jürgen Schmidhuber. The sacred infrastruc-
ture for computational research. In Proceedings of the Python in Science Conferences-SciPy Conferences,
2017.
[13] Ishaan Gulrajani, Faruk Ahmed, Martin Arjovsky, Vincent Dumoulin, and Aaron C Courville. Improved
training of wasserstein gans. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 5767–5777,
2017.
[14] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition.
In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–778, 2016.
9
[15] Martin Heusel, Hubert Ramsauer, Thomas Unterthiner, Bernhard Nessler, and Sepp Hochreiter. Gans
trained by a two time-scale update rule converge to a local nash equilibrium. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pages 6626–6637, 2017.
[16] Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, and Aleksander Madry.
Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 125–136, 2019.
[17] Pang Wei Koh and Percy Liang. Understanding black-box predictions via influence functions. In
Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2017, Sydney, NSW,
Australia, 6-11 August 2017, pages 1885–1894, 2017.
[18] Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. 2009.
[19] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical world. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[20] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. Deep learning. nature, 521(7553):436–444, 2015.
[21] Yishay Mansour and Mariano Schain. Robust domain adaptation. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, 71(4):365–380, 2014.
[22] Mehdi Mirza and Simon Osindero. Conditional generative adversarial nets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1411.1784,
2014.
[23] Adam Paszke, Sam Gross, Francisco Massa, Adam Lerer, James Bradbury, Gregory Chanan, Trevor
Killeen, Zeming Lin, Natalia Gimelshein, Luca Antiga, Alban Desmaison, Andreas Kopf, Edward Yang,
Zachary DeVito, Martin Raison, Alykhan Tejani, Sasank Chilamkurthy, Benoit Steiner, Lu Fang, Junjie
Bai, and Soumith Chintala. Pytorch: An imperative style, high-performance deep learning library. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, pages 8024–8035. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019.
[24] Luis Perez and Jason Wang. The effectiveness of data augmentation in image classification using deep
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04621, 2017.
[25] Daniel Styer. The geometrical significance of the laplacian. American Journal of Physics, 83:992–997, 12
2015.
[26] Arun Sai Suggala, Adarsh Prasad, Vaishnavh Nagarajan, and Pradeep Ravikumar. Revisiting adversarial
risk. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02924, 2018.
[27] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and
Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[28] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and
Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks, 2014.
[29] Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner, and Aleksander Madry. Robust-
ness may be at odds with accuracy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.12152, 2018.
[30] Vikas Verma, Alex Lamb, Christopher Beckham, Amir Najafi, Ioannis Mitliagkas, David Lopez-Paz, and
Yoshua Bengio. Manifold mixup: Better representations by interpolating hidden states. In Kamalika
Chaudhuri and Ruslan Salakhutdinov, editors, Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on
Machine Learning, volume 97 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 6438–6447, Long
Beach, California, USA, 2019. PMLR.
[31] Chaowei Xiao, Bo Li, Jun yan Zhu, Warren He, Mingyan Liu, and Dawn Song. Generating adversarial
examples with adversarial networks. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-18, pages 3905–3911. International Joint Conferences on Artificial
Intelligence Organization, 7 2018.
[32] Sangdoo Yun, Dongyoon Han, Seong Joon Oh, Sanghyuk Chun, Junsuk Choe, and Youngjoon Yoo.
Cutmix: Regularization strategy to train strong classifiers with localizable features. In Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision, pages 6023–6032, 2019.
[33] Hongyi Zhang, Moustapha Cisse, Yann N Dauphin, and David Lopez-Paz. mixup: Beyond empirical risk
minimization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.09412, 2017.
10
Supplementary Material for ‘On Data Augmentation and
Adversarial Risk: An Empirical Analysis’
Table of Contents
A Extended Results and Setup 11
A.1 Augmentation Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2 Training Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3 Attack Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.4 GAN Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.5 Extended Results for Adversarial Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.6 Extended Results for Influence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.7 Extended Results for the Prediction-Change Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B Network Architectures 21
C Tools and Libraries 21
A Extended Results and Setup
In this section, we present our extended results, including:
1. Risk under adversarial attack with linf norm (see Section A.5).
2. Prediction-change stress using BBεpxq with linf norm (see Section A.7).
3. The distribution of the average gradient-norm on the augmented and non-augmented training examples
(see Section A.6).
4. The distribution of the loss for augmented and non-augmented training examples (see Section A.6).
5. Examples of various augmentation methods based on our definition of augmentation (see Section A.1).
The remainder of this section is as follows. Section A.1 provides examples of different augmentation methods
based on Definition 1. Section A.2 describes the setup used in the training of the models, and provides more
details on various aspects such as training image classification models, and applying data augmentation. The
details of the adversarial attacks are provided in Section A.3. More information about our GAN training are
given in Section A.4. Our extended empirical results can be found in Sections A.5, A.6, and A.7. The network
architectures used in the GAN training are shown in Section B, and finally the libraries and tools used in this
study are detailed in Section C.
A.1 Augmentation Examples
Noise adding can be formalized as data augmentation A : pX ˆ Yqs Ñ  X ˆ Y Ñ Rd(r by
ApSq “ ppx1 ` Z1, lpx1qq, . . . , pxr ` Zr, lpxrqqq , (9)
where Z1, . . . , Zr are i.i.d random variables on r0, s.
Random cropping parts of some vector x P X can be realized by zeroing a random number of the “outer”
elements by means of
ApSq “ ``1pU11,U21qpx1q, lpx1q˘, . . . , `1pU1r,U2rqpxrq, lpxrq˘˘ , (10)
where 1pU,U 1qpxq “ p0, . . . , 0, xU , . . . , xd´U 1 , 0, . . . , 0q and U11, . . . , U2r are random variables on t1, . . . , ru.
Permuting, e.g. swapping, the elements of a vector x “ px1, . . . , xdq P X can also be formalized as augmenta-
tion, e.g. by
ApSq “ ``pxpi1p1q, . . . , xpi1pdqq, lpx1q˘ , . . . , `pxpirp1q, . . . , xpirpdqq, lpxrq˘˘ (11)
where pi1, . . . , pir : t1, . . . , du Ñ t1, . . . , du are permutation functions.
The following Lemma allows to express data augmentations as composition of data augmentations.
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Lemma 1. If A and B are data augmentations then A ˝B is also a data augmentation.
Proof. If A and B are both data augmentations then A : pX ˆ Yqs1 Ñ  X ˆ Y Ñ Rd(r1 and B : pX ˆ
Yqs2 Ñ  X ˆ Y Ñ Rd(r2 for some s1, s2, r1, r2 P N. Then the composition A ˝B is such that
A ˝B : pX ˆ Yqs2 Ñ
!
X ˆ Y Ñ Rd
)r1
.
It remains to show that the marginal measure P r1
X1
I
of some vector ApS˜q, resulting from a sample S˜ with measure
P s1XI augmented by A, dominates the measure P
s2
X of some original sample S. By assumption, P
r1
X
1
I
pDq “ 0
implies P s1XI pDq “ 0 and P r2XI pDq “ 0 implies P s2XI pDq “ 0 for any measurable D and measures P r2XI , P s2XI
corresponding to B. Therefore, P r1
X
1
I
pDq “ 0 implies P s2X pDq “ 0.
Classical (Expert-based) data augmentation is often defined by domain experts who introduce simple transfor-
mations such as noise adding, cropping and swapping formalized above and denoted AN , AC , AS , respectively.
Following Lemma 1 the combination can be formalized by
A :“ AN ˝AC ˝AS . (12)
GAN3 augmentation can be formalized as composition of class-specific data augmentations by interpreting the
GAN training on the sample S as part of the augmentation. In the setting of [10], the output measure of the
GAN equals the original measure of S under general assumptions and therefore dominates the measure of S.
Mixup [33] data augmentation transforms the data by
ApSq “ ``p1´M1q ¨ xi1 `M1 ¨ xj1 , p1´M1q ¨ lpxi1q `M1 ¨ lpxj1q˘, . . . ,`p1´Mrq ¨ xi `Mr ¨ xj , p1´Mrq ¨ lpxiq `Mr ¨ lpxjq˘˘, (13)
where i, i1, j, j1 P t1, . . . , su, i ‰ i1 ‰ j ‰ j1 and M1, . . . ,Mr „ Betapα, αq for α ą 0.
A.2 Training Setup
A.2.1 Image classification
Image classification experiments are carried out on CIFAR10 [18] using a ResNet50 [14]. The ResNet model
was trained using SGD and weight-decay with penalty coefficient of 5e´ 4. Each classifier was trained for 200
epochs and learning rate schedule was used with initial value of 0.1, which was reduced twice by a factor of 10
every 80 epochs. This resulted in the best classification error of 5.39˘ 0.10% on the test set using classical data
augmentation with PAug “ 0.8.
A.2.2 Data Augmentation
During training, using a stochastic data loader, samples are drown from the augmented set with probability
PAug , and 1´ PAug from the original training set.
For classical augmentation, the random rotation is done by up to 2 degrees; brightness, contrast and saturation
distortion values are uniformly chosen from r0.75, 1.25s; and random cropping is applied after padding 4 pixels
to each side of the image.
For GAN augmentations, an ‘augmented dataset’ is created for each of the GAN models, using GAN-generated
images. The size of this dataset is 200 times larger than the training set of CIFAR10, as the models are trained
for 200 epochs. For each of the GAN-augmentations, given every training sample, 200 samples are generated
and used as an ‘augmented’ version of the chosen training sample. The generator is conditioned on the label of
each training sample.
For Mixup and Classical augmentations, an ‘augmented dataset’ is created with the same size as the training-set
of CIFAR10 (50k): for each training sample, 1 augmented data is created using the augmentation method. For
models trained with Mixup and Classical augmentations, the augmented samples are then chosen from the
created dataset with probability 1
200
, or otherwise are created on-the-fly4.
The ‘augmented datasets’ were used in the evaluations of models with prediction-change stress around the
augmented data, and the influence scores of the augmented data.
3A label-conditional GAN is intended here.
4This is done to reduce loading time and speedup experiments, as Classical and Mixup augmentations are
faster if created on the fly.
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A.2.3 Additional Discussions about Data Augmentation
In our experiments, each augmentation method is applied alone. Although the results in [33] suggests that
Mixup improves adversarial robustness (against FGSM [11] attacks), the models in [33] were trained with a
combination of Mixup and Classical augmentation.
A.3 Attack Setup
We carry out 4 different untargeted PGD attacks with l2 norm. Additionally, we apply 6 untargeted PGD attacks
with linf norm. The parameters of these attacks are provided in Table 1.
Table (1) PGD attack parameters used in the experiments.
PGD PGDα Iterations norm
0.25 0.5 10 100 l2
0.5 0.1 10 100 l2
0.03 0.006 10 100 linf
0.05 0.01 10 100 linf
0.1 0.02 10 100 linf
A.4 GAN Setup
(a) NS GAN. (b) WGP GAN.
Figure (4) Random generated samples from the NS and WGP GANs, conditioned on different
labels. The conditioning labels in each row are fixed.
We use a GAN that incorporates convolutional layers with residual connections in both generator and discrimina-
tor. The TTUR learning-rates [15] were used for the generator and the discriminator. A 100-dimensional noise
was concatenated with a 10-dimensional one-hot encoded labels as the input to the generator. The discriminator
consist of a model with 2 outputs: one for discriminating between the real and fake, and another for classifying
the image into 10 classes. The classification and GAN objective were jointly optimized. The GANs were trained
for 120 epochs. No data augmentation was used in training of the GAN models. The GAN architectures are
detailed in Section B. The trained GANs are evaluated with the ‘Fréchet Inception Distance’ (FID), and the
results of this evaluation can be found in Table 2.
A.5 Extended Results for Adversarial Attacks
In Figure 5 we present the results of Risk Under Attack with PGD, using linf norm, for different iterations
and PGD values. As can be seen, similar to the results in Figure 1 Mixup achieves the highest risk under
adversarial attack in all cases. It can additionally be observed that while risk under adversarial attack increases as
the augmentation probability rises for models trained with Mixup, the models trained with classical augmentation
result in lower risk as the augmentation probability increases. These observations are also on par with the results
presented in Section 3.3.
13
Table (2) FID for WGP and NS GANs on CIFAR10.
WGP NS
FID 20.11 18.30
Figure (5) Risk Under Adversarial Attack (RUA) for PGD attacks with linf norm for different
augmentation methods on the test set of CIFAR10.
A.6 Extended Results for Influence Analysis
In this section we provide the extended results for the influence scores, the loss distribution, and the average
gradient-norm distribution of the augmented, and non-augmented samples.
A.6.1 The Distribution of the Average Gradient-Norm and the Loss
The distribution of the ‘average gradient-norm’ for augmented, and the non-augmented data, on various models
are provided in Figure 6. The average gradient-norm for a minibatch of training examples is calculated by the
l2 norm of the gradient of the loss w.r.t the model parameters, averaged over all parameters. Additionally, the
distribution of the loss for augmented, and non-augmented data, can be found in Figure 7. All models used for
the loss and the average gradient-norm plots are fully-trained.
As can be seen, the distribution values for both loss and average gradient-norms suggest that the value ranges in
the augmented data, are higher than the non-augmented data, across all models. The relatively lower average
gradient-norm in the non-augmented data suggests that the parameters of the model do not change in the same
order when trained on the non-augmented data, in comparison with the augmented data. In contrast, when
trained on augmented samples, models have a higher average gradient-norm, which results in a relatively higher
change in the parameters of the models.
This observation suggests that models are more affected by the augmented data, than the non-augmented data.
These results are also aligned with the influence score results presented in Section 3.5, which stated the models
are influenced by the augmented data more than the non-augmented data.
A.6.2 The Distribution of the Influence Scores
In Figure 8, we provide the scatter plots of the influence scores of augmented and non-augmented examples,
when predicting on the test set, and their adversarial counterparts. The marginal histograms for all augmented
and non-augmented influence scores are also provided in the side plots. For a better view, we separate the colours
for the positive (`) and negative (´) influence values for augmented (aug) and non-augmented (orig) training
data. Each point on the scatter plot, represents the influence score of a training example, for a model when
predicting on an unseen (test or adversarial) example. The X value of the point, represents the influence score of
a non-augmented example, while its Y value shows the influence score of its augmented counterpart.
Looking at the diagonal black dashed line, we can see that the datapoints are not scattered along this line, which
means the influence of non-augmented samples are not similar to the influence of their augmented counterparts.
As can be seen, the influence from the augmented data is larger (in both positive and negative), compared to
non-augmented data, as it was previously reported in Figure 3.
We can additionally observe that in the case of Mixup, the influence scores are more spread compared to other
augmentations. Looking at the vertical side histogram plots (right side), we can observe that in the majority
of the models trained with Mixup, the distribution of the influence scores for the augmented data is shifted
more to the negative side (bottom side of the red dashed line) when models predict on adversarial examples, in
comparison with predicting on normal test examples. As the negative influence values represent training data
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points that contribute to increase the loss on a given unseen example, they have a negative influence on the
model’s prediction. This observation suggests that the Mixup-augmented training examples have more negative
influence when predicting on adversarial examples. These results are also aligned with the risk under attack (see
Figures 1, 5, 2, and 12) which shows models trained with Mixup are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Figure (6) Distribution of the average gradient-norm for augmented and non-augmented data. The
plot on the left has a logarithmically scaled X-axis, and a symmetrically logarithmically scaled Y-axis.
In the plot on the right, both X and Y axes are scaled symmetrically logarithmic for a better view.
A.7 Extended Results for the Prediction-Change Stress
A.7.1 Results with l2 norm
Figure 9 shows the distribution of Prediction-Change Stress (with  “ 1) over the data points of the original
training, augmented training, and test sets. In Figure 10 we provide additional plots showing how the prediction-
change stress changes when  is increased. Also in Figure 11, we show how the prediction-change stress changes
by increasing the PAug .
We can observe that increasing the augmentation percentage increases the prediction-change stress values around
the original training data (sub-figures a,d and g in Figure 9). On the augmented data, sub-figures b,e,h in Figure 9
show that stress around the augmented data with classical augmentation does not change with increasing the
augmentation probability. The stress increases around Mixup augmented data points and decreases around the
data points augmented with GANs. Although classical data augmentations results in relatively larger stress
around both the original and the augmented training data points, this effect does not translate to the unseen test
set. Mixup augmentation results in the highest prediction-change stress around the testing points as shown in
subfigures f,i in Figure 9.
A.7.2 Results with linf norm
The prediction-change stress using BBε “ tx P Rd | maxdk“1 xk “ εu (linf norm) are provided in Figure 12.
We provide the prediction-change stress for the 50k non-augmented, and 50k augmented examples randomly
chosen from the training set, and for all the 10k test examples. We randomly sample 1k points from the sphere
surface BBεpxq around each data point x. We evaluate models trained with all augmentation methods, for
PAug P t0.1, 0.5, 0.9u.
In Figure 13, we provide additional plots showing how the prediction-change stress changes when larger  values
are used. Additionally, we show in Figure 14, how the prediction-change stress changes when PAug is increased.
Finally, in Figure 15 the plots for prediction-change stress with  “ 0.05 are provided for different percentiles
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Figure (7) Distribution of loss for augmented and non-augmented data. The plot on the left has a
logarithmically scaled X-axis, and a symmetrically logarithmically scaled Y-axis. In the plot on the
right, both X and Y axes are scaled symmetrically logarithmic for a better view.
of the prediction-change stress. These results outline the distribution of the prediction-change stress in different
models.
As can be seen, prediction-change stress with linf follows a similar trend to the results with the l2 norm as
reported in Section 3.4, as well as the results discussed in Section A.7.1 of the Appendix.
The provided results using various norms, and across different experiments, suggest a strong correlation between
the prediction-change stress and risk under adversarial attack, which provides more evidence for the prediction-
change stress to be used as a new measure for evaluating models in the adversarial setting.
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Figure (8) Comparison between the positive and negative influence values of all original data vs.
their augmented counterparts for different augmentation methods, when predicting on the real and the
adversarial test set of CIFAR10. The side histograms represent the marginal distribution of influence
values for augmented and original (non-augmented). Both axis have a symmetrical logarithmic scale,
with equal length. The black dashed line represent the line X “ Y . The red dashed lines in the side
plots, represent the zero value reference.
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(a) . (b) . (c) .
(d) . (e) . (f) .
(g) . (h) . (i) .
Figure (9) Comparison between the distribution Prediction-Change Stress of models with different
augmentations using l2 norm, around original training, augmented training, and test set of CIFAR10,
and for  “ 1. First row: 0.1 augmentation. Second row: 0.5 augmentation. Third row: 0.9
augmentation. First column: PCS around the original training set. Second column: PCS around the
augmented training set. Third column: PCS around the test set.
Figure (10) Comparison between the average Prediction-Change Stress of models with different
augmentations using l2 norm. The y-axis is the average Stress calculated over all the original training,
augmented training, and test set of CIFAR10.
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Figure (11) Comparison between the average Prediction-Change Stress of models with different
augmentations using l2 norm. The y-axis is the average Stress calculated over all the original training,
augmented training, and test set of CIFAR10.
Figure (12) Comparison between the Prediction-Change Stress of models with different augmenta-
tions using linf norm. The y-axis indicates the different sets. The non-Aug and Aug. refer to the
training set.
Figure (13) Comparison between the Prediction-Change Stress of models with different augmen-
tations using linf norm. The y-axis is the average Stress calculated over all the original training,
augmented training, and test set of CIFAR10.
19
Figure (14) Comparison between the average Prediction-Change Stress of models with different
augmentations using linf norm. The y-axis is the average Stress calculated over all the original
training, augmented training, and test set of CIFAR10.
(a) . (b) . (c) .
(d) . (e) . (f) .
(g) . (h) . (i) .
Figure (15) Comparison between the distribution Prediction-Change Stress of models with different
augmentations using linf norm, around the original training, the augmented training, and the test set
of CIFAR10, and for  “ 0.05. First row: 0.1 augmentation. Second row: 0.5 augmentation. Third
row: 0.9 augmentation. First column: PCS around the original training set. Second column: PCS
around the augmented training set. Third column: PCS around the test set.
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B Network Architectures
The network architectures used in the GAN models are provided in Table 3.
Table (3) The architectures of the generator (left) and the discriminator (right).
Gen. Layer (type) Shape Param #
Linear-1 [1024] 113,664
BatchNorm2d-2 [ 64, 4, 4] 128
ReLU-3 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Upsample-4 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Conv2d-5 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
BatchNorm2d-6 [ 64, 8, 8] 128
ReLU-7 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Conv2d-8 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
Upsample-9 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
ResBlockGenerator-10 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
BatchNorm2d-11 [ 64, 8, 8] 128
ReLU-12 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Upsample-13 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
Conv2d-14 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
BatchNorm2d-15 [ 64, 16, 16] 128
ReLU-16 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
Conv2d-17 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
Upsample-18 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
ResBlockGenerator-19 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
BatchNorm2d-20 [ 64, 16, 16] 128
ReLU-21 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
Upsample-22 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
Conv2d-23 [ 64, 32, 32] 36,928
BatchNorm2d-24 [ 64, 32, 32] 128
ReLU-25 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
Conv2d-26 [ 64, 32, 32] 36,928
Upsample-27 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
ResBlockGenerator-28 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
BatchNorm2d-29 [ 64, 32, 32] 128
ReLU-30 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
Conv2d-31 [ 3, 32, 32] 1,731
Tanh-32 [ 3, 32, 32] 0
Disc. Layer (type) Shape Param #
BatchNorm2d-1 [ 3, 32, 32] 6
Conv2d-2 [ 64, 32, 32] 1,792
Conv2d-3 [ 64, 32, 32] 1,792
ReLU-4 [ 64, 32, 32] 0
Conv2d-5 [ 64, 32, 32] 36,928
Conv2d-6 [ 64, 32, 32] 36,928
AvgPool2d-7 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
AvgPool2d-8 [ 3, 16, 16] 0
Conv2d-9 [ 64, 16, 16] 256
Conv2d-10 [ 64, 16, 16] 256
FirstResBlockDiscriminator-11 [ 64, 16, 1 6] 0
ReLU-12 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
Conv2d-13 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
Conv2d-14 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
ReLU-15 [ 64, 16, 16] 0
Conv2d-16 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
Conv2d-17 [ 64, 16, 16] 36,928
AvgPool2d-18 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Conv2d-19 [ 64, 16, 16] 4,160
Conv2d-20 [ 64, 16, 16] 4,160
AvgPool2d-21 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
ResBlockDiscriminator-22 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
ReLU-23 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Conv2d-24 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
Conv2d-25 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
ReLU-26 [ 64, 8, 8] 0
Conv2d-27 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
Conv2d-28 [ 64, 8, 8] 36,928
AvgPool2d-29 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Conv2d-30 [ 64, 8, 8] 4,160
Conv2d-31 [ 64, 8, 8] 4,160
AvgPool2d-32 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
ResBlockDiscriminator-33 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
ReLU-34 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Conv2d-35 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
Conv2d-36 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
ReLU-37 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Conv2d-38 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
Conv2d-39 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
ResBlockDiscriminator-40 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
ReLU-41 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Conv2d-42 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
Conv2d-43 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
ReLU-44 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
Conv2d-45 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
Conv2d-46 [ 64, 4, 4] 36,928
ResBlockDiscriminator-47 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
ReLU-48 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
AvgPool2d-49 [ 64, 1, 1] 0
Linear-50 [ 1] 65
ResBlockClassifier-47 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
ReLU-48 [ 64, 4, 4] 0
AvgPool2d-49 [ 64, 1, 1] 0
Linear-50 [ 10] 650
C Tools and Libraries
All experiments have been implemented in python using pytorch lib [23]. The adversarial attacks are done
using the robustness lib [9]. For logging the experiments and controlling hyperparameters and randomness,
sacred lib [12] is used. For analysing the results, incense lib [6] was used to fetch the results from the
sacred lib database.
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